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nvironmental protection and natural resource management 
are highly complicated, dynamic processes intersecting 
natural and social systems. Policies related to these issues 
involve a broad array of inputs, including, among others, scientific 
data, legal information, value judgments, philosophical 
perspectives, and economic decisions, and they can have 
momentous consequences not only at international, national, and 
state levels, but also for communities and individuals. In 
recognition of these impacts, policy and lawmakers in 50+ 
countries are pursuing community-based approaches to 
environmental protection and natural resource management by 
delegating some degree of management and decision-making 
authority over parks or other protected areas; forests; water, coastal 
resources, and fisheries; wildlife; and other natural resources to 
community user groups.2  
One framework for promoting citizen participation in the 
management of public natural resources is the Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management Model (CBNRM). This model 
adopts a socio-ecological approach that integrates local 
institutions, customary practices, and community knowledge 
structures into natural adaptive systems protection and 
administration. It is believed that consideration of these factors and 
that involvement of local stakeholders in management, regulatory, 
and enforcement processes will result in improved resource 
management outcomes.3 
This paper will briefly describe the CBNRM model and will review 
its use in relation to various levels and categories of legal 
obligations in two very different contexts. It also will consider 
barriers that have been identified to citizen participation in these 
CBNRM models and will explore how law or other instruments 
might be utilized to respond to these challenges.4 
                                                
1 Contact: jacobs@utk.edu 
2 Derek Armitage, Adaptive Capacity and Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 35 
ENVTL. MGMT. 703, 403 (2005), available at  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00267-004-0076-z/fulltext.html.  
3 Id. 
4 This paper supports and complements the thesis set forth in the article submitted by 
Wendy E. Wagner for this symposium, The Missing Link in Citizen Participation in U.S. 
E 
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§ 1 – THE MODEL 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management is a very flexible 
management approach. Under the model, the state retains primary 
ownership of the land or other resource, and it also retains some 
form of management authority.5 Local communities in CBNRM 
projects assume legal obligations and obtain rights or privileges to 
use and benefit from environmental or natural resources in a 
defined area.6 By incentivizing stakeholder populations to 
sustainably manage the relevant resource and by leveraging that 
population’s local expertise about natural and social conditions, the 
CBNRM approach seeks to improve environmental and 
socioeconomic outcomes.7  
CBNRM programs are designed and implemented in their own 
cultural contexts, and they can take multiple forms. There are, 
however, several elements that frequently appear to be present in 
successful programs. For example, researchers agree that most 
effective collaborative schemes have clearly defined communities 
of users and resource systems.8 These elements ensures that those 
who bear the cost of the program receive its benefits. Relatedly, in 
successful CBNRM ventures, external governmental entities 
recognize the rights or interests of community users in the 
resource,9 and community rules require an equitable alignment of 
user costs and benefits.10   
Monitoring, proportional sanctions, and low-cost dispute 
resolution are other features commonly found in the rules of 
productive CBNRM programs, as are rules: (1) that have been 
developed by or in collaboration with the community, (2) that are 
based upon local conditions, and (3) that are flexible and 
incorporate procedures for future modifications.11 Sufficient 
external support, whether financial or administrative, 
governmental or non-governmental, is another important factor. 12   
                                                
Administrative Process. In her article, Professor Wagner argues that there is “a disconnect 
between the procedural means of ensuring participation and the end goal of engaging 
affected groups in US administrative process.” (Emphasis omitted). The CBNRM is a 
one alternative for engaging affected groups in both the administrative and the 
management processes. 
5 CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW ET AL., WHOSE RESOURCES? WHOSE COMMON GOOD? 
TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST IN INDONESIA 2, 9-10, 14 (Jan. 2002), available at http:// 
www.ciel.org/Publications/Whose_Resources_3-27-02.pdf. 
6 WHOSE RESOURCES?, supra note 5, at 2. 
7 See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson & Diana Pei Wu, Non-State Actor Access and Influence in 
International Legal and Policy Negotiations, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 193, 201-03 (2010). 
8 Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold & Sergio Villamayor Tomás, A Review of Design Principles for 




12 Stefan Carpenter, The Devolution of Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace Community-
Based Resource Management, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 17 (2011). See also infra § 3.  
When external governmental support is viewed as control or imposition, however, it can 
disincentivize the target communities. See Thomas G. Measham & Jared Lumbasi, Success 
Factors for Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM): Lessons from Kenya and 
Australia, 52 ENVTL. MGMT. 1, 2 (2013). Further, user communities are also subject to 
leadership failures and negative political dynamics. See id. These and other issues have 
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Not all prosperous CBNRM programs will be based upon these 
design elements, and, concomitantly, failing projects may feature 
many of these components. However, a combination of these 
organizational characteristics appears to typify robust institutions 
for managing common-pool resources.13  
§ 2 – EXAMPLES 
CBRNM sites are located throughout the world, and the model’s 
principles have been applied across a broad range of natural 
resources and communities. The following two examples 
demonstrate its flexibility and its potential for improving the 
quality and effectiveness of citizen participation in environmental 
and natural resource management.  
 CITES and Wildlife in Namibia 
The Republic of Namibia is a sparsely populated country situated 
along the south Atlantic coast of Africa.14 It is a member of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES), the international convention designed 
to ensure that international trade does not threaten the 
sustainability of listed wild animals and plant species.15  
After gaining its independence in the early 1990’s, the new 
Namibian government was confronted with the monumental task 
of promoting social development and economic growth while 
preserving the nation’s rapidly disappearing wildlife resources. 
Because hunting prohibitions had been inadequately enforced, 
impoverished Namibians reportedly had hunted wildlife illegally on 
communal lands and cooperated with commercial poachers.16 
These conditions resulted in the decimation of a number of species 
in the country, including black rhinos, elephants, zebras, and lions; 
one source estimates that wildlife populations in northern Namibia 
may have been reduced by up to 90%.17  
Consistent with its obligations under CITES and its goals to 
promote both sustainable economic and wildlife resource 
development, the Namibian government enacted the Nature 
Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 (1996 Act) authorizing any 
                                                
subjected CBNRM principles to critical scrutiny. See, e.g., Stephen Turner, A Crisis in 
CBNRM? Affirming the Commons in Southern Africa, 10th IASCP Conference, Oaxaca, 
Mexico, available at:  
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001501/00/Turner_Crisis_040508_Paper361.pd
f. Even critical commentators opine, however, that the model’s philosophy is sound and 
that CBNRM programs should perform well under the right circumstances. Measham & 
Lumbasi, supra.   
13 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990). 
14 Overview, Government of Namibia, http://www.gov.na/about-namibia. 
15 What is Cites?, Cites: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php. There currently are 
181 State Parties to CITES; Namibia became a Party in 1990. See List of Contracting Parties, 
https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php. 
16 Carpenter, supra note 12, at 16. 
17 Id. (citations omitted). 
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group of people residing on communal land to apply for 
conservancy status.18 Legal conservancies must have a defined 
membership with a representative management committee, a 
defined border, and a legally-enforceable constitution that provides 
for a wildlife management strategy and an equitable distribution of 
benefits.19 The Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) has 
the discretion to recognize a conservancy, subject to any 
conditions, and to withdraw or amend that recognition at any time. 
Recognized conservancies have the right to hunt, capture, cull, and 
sell “huntable” game and may apply to the MET for permits to use 
protected game quotas for trophy hunting.20  
As of 2014, there were 82 registered conservancies, impacting 
approximately 177,435 people and covering an estimated 20% of 
Namibia’s land mass.21 There are similar community associations 
operating in a Namibian national park and in over 30 community 
forests.22 Advocates of Nambia’s conservancy programs proudly note 
that the 1996 Act’s legislative framework “devolves 100% of the 
benefits from the sustainable use of wildlife to resident communities 
… and recognizes the conservancy as the legitimate manager and 
beneficiary of both consumptive and non-consumptive commercial 
forms of wildlife use.”23 These benefits purportedly advance 
sustainability goals by improving the competitiveness of wildlife vis-
à-vis agriculture as a land-use and by creating legal incentives for 
communities to conserve wildlife.24 Conservancy monitoring systems 
report that poaching has decreased;25 Namibian elephant populations 
increased from approximately 5,000 to 16,000 from 1984 to 2008,26 
and other wildlife species have experienced similarly impressive 
population increases.27 The recovery of conservancy wildlife stocks 
has stimulated private sector investment in the conservancies in the 
form of trophy hunting and wildlife harvesting as well as tourism 
                                                
18 Nature Conservation Amendment Act (1996). 
19 Id. at § 3. See also Karol Boudreaux, A New Call of the Wild: Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management in Namibia, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 304-05 (2008). 
20 Carpenter, supra note 12, at 24-25. 
21 Summary of Conservancies,  
http://www.nacso.org.na/SOC_profiles/conservancysummary.php. This figure is likely 
underreported as it represents data from only 79 of the 82 conservancies. Id. 
22 Elephants Don’t Like Coke or Fanta, What’s New, Namibian Association of CBNRM 
Support Organisations, http://www.nacso.org.na/index.php. 
23 L. Chris Weaver, Elly Hamunyela, Richard Diggle, Greenwell Matongo & Theunis 
Pietersen, The Catalytic Role and Contributions of Sustainable Wildlife Use to the Namibia 
CBNRM Programme, CITES AND CBNRM - PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON “The Relevance of CBNRM to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of CITES-
Listed Species in Exporting Countries” 59, 61 (ICUN Max Abensperg-Traun, Dilys Roe & 
Colman O’Criodain eds. 2011) (CITES AND CBNRM). This author takes no position in 
the debate regarding sustainable extractive uses of wildlife. Many have fundamental 
ethical objections to hunting or to any other extractive practices that they designate as 
exploitative. Proponents contend that these objections are related more to “western 
cultural sensitivities surrounding the welfare of charismatic animals” than to conservation 
values. Id. at 137. 
24 Id. at 61. 
25 Id. at 61 n.3. 
26 Carpenter, supra note 12, at 28. 
27 Id.  
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lodges and camps, often the result of joint ventures between investors 
and conservancies.28  
Citizen participation in the conservancies produce benefits for 
users beyond the economic and environmental. Members develop 
administrative, dispute resolution, management, and leadership 
competencies; expand their social networks; and generally enhance 
social capital.29 Namibian conservancies are responding to gender 
equity issues: women purportedly are active participants on 
conservancy committees and in management positions in 
registered conservancies. Conservancies are leveraging their 
financial, physical, and human resources for rural development 
activities such as local education, water supply, and public health. 
While some have noted program shortcomings,30 most agree that 
Namibia’s conservancy program is a successful example of 
CBNRM.  
 The Magnuson-Stevens Act and the U.S. Atlantic 
Cod Fishery 
The New England coast of the U.S. is home to the Atlantic cod 
fishery, once one of the most productive fishing grounds for this 
fish in the world.31 Stocks collapsed in the 1990’s due to 
overfishing, and they are still dangerously in decline.32 Commercial 
and recreational fishing interests, politicians and regulators, the 
environmental community, and the general public all have a stake 
in this fishery and have opinions about how best to respond to the 
crisis. 
All US fisheries are subject to overlapping layers of legal authority. 
At the national level,33 the 1976 Magnuson Fisheries Conservation 
and Management Act (Magnuson Act)34 and its reauthorizing 
legislation, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), also referred to as the 
MSA or the Sustainable Fisheries Act, establish exclusive federal 
authority over fisheries from three miles to two hundred miles 
offshore.35 The Magnuson Act was promulgated initially to 
                                                
28 Id. at 27. Investors and commercial hunting operators often include conservation and 
social empowerment clauses in their contracts with the conservancies that incentivize 
long-term maintenance of wildlife populations and critical habitats. See CITES AND 
CBNRM, supra note 23, at 63.  
29 Id.  
30 For example, Article 21(g) of the Namibian Constitution guarantees citizens the right 
to “move freely throughout Namibia[,]” preventing the exclusion of non-members from 
conservancy lands. NAMIB. CONST. art. 21(g). There also are uncertainties pertaining 
to customary land rights within conservancies.  See Boudreaux, supra note 19, at 322-24. 
31 Georges Bank, Atlantic, Places in the Sea,  
https://marine-conservation.org/media/shining_sea/place_atlantic_georges.htm. 
32 André Verani, Community-Based Management of Atlantic Cod by the Georges Bank Hook Sector: 
Is It a Model Fishery?, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 359, 361-65 (2007). 
33 While beyond the scope of this short article, international law also has played a role in 
the allocation of fishery resources in Georges Bank. See Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12). 
34 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988). 
35 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891 (2012). The reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is 
currently being considered in the U.S. Congress. H.R. 1335 – 114th Congress: 
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respond to foreign fishing by promoting the development of a 
domestic fleet and to involve local fishing communities in the 
management process; the reauthorized Magnuson-Stevens Act also 
incorporates conservation goals for all US fisheries, including stock 
recovery provisions such as annual catch limits, accountability 
measures, and possible essential fish habitat (EFH) designations.36  
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) shares 
federal responsibility for fisheries with eight regional councils,37 
including the New England Fishery Management Council 
(NEFMC). NEFMC has management authority over the Atlantic 
cod fishery and is required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act to 
formulate a Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for relevant stock. 
Its Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) FMP establishes 
management measures for thirteen groundfish species, including 
the Atlantic cod.38 Early plans failed to reverse the cod crisis.  
In 2003, in an effort to experiment with alternative conservation 
models, the NEFMC advanced one proposal, Amendment 13,39 to 
the Northeast Multispecies FMP. This proposal, among other 
things, created a CBNRM-like trial program that allowed fishermen 
to organize and manage their own “sectors.” Sectors received a 
prescribed allocation of the fishery’s quota based upon their fishing 
history, a fundamental shift of approach from a management 
regime based primarily upon input controls such as area closures, 
vessel and gear restrictions, and limits on “days at seas.”40 The trial 
was deemed a success, and, in 2010, the sector approach was 
expanded and formalized in Amendment 16.41  
Each approved sector develops a binding Operations Plan and a 
Sector Contract with compliance plans for quotas and conservation 
measures. NOAA Fisheries must approve the Operations Plan, 
and all sector members must execute the Sector Contract.42 If a 
                                                
Strengthening Fishing Communities and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries Management 
Act, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1335. 
36 See Verani, supra note 32, at 366-67. See generally Peter Shelley, Taking Stock: The Magnuson-
Stevens Act Revisited: Have the Managers Finally Gotten it Right?: Federal Groundfish Management 
in New England, 17 ROGER WMS. L. REV. 21, 30, (2012). 
37 NOAA Fisheries is a division of NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, an agency of the Department of Commerce. See Verani, supra note 32, at 
365. 
38 New England Fishery Mgmt. Council, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Northeast 
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nefmc.org/MultiSpecies-FMP.pdf. 
39 Amendment 13, New England Fishery Mgmt. Council, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 
Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nefmc.org/Final-Amendment-13-SEISVol.-I-II.pdf. 
The Conservation Law Foundation and other organizations successfully filed suit against 
NOAA Fisheries challenging Amendment 13 on conservation-related grounds. See 
Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A discussion of 
the challenges to Amendment 13 exceeds the scope of this article. 
40 See Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
Deliver on Its Conservation Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV. 579, 602 (2004). 
41 Amendment 16, New England Fishery Mgmt. Council, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 
Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, 
 http://s3.amazonaws.com/nefmc.org/091016_Final_Amendment_16.pdf. 
Amendment 16 was also challenged in court. Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F. Supp. 2d 95, 121 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). See also Shelley, supra note 36. 
42 See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 648.87. 
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sector complies with its quota, its future annual catch limit will not 
be reduced even if the general fishery exceeds its target fishing 
allocation.43 Sector members may trade or lease their stock 
allocations through their sector managers.44 Catch and other 
compliance measures are monitored.45  
Despite the tremendous shift in operating culture that it represents, 
the region’s fishing community appears to be adapting to the sector 
approach. NOAA Fisheries reports that sectors catch nearly 98% 
of the groundfish harvest.46 Within the sector system, members 
have much more flexibility to manage their fishing. For example, 
they are not limited to days at sea or number of trips, and they can 
freely trade quota.47 They also can decide when to fish, allowing 
them to time the market better, and sectors have begun to directly 
contract with large retailers. Boat size is no longer as much of a 
factor, and sectors members are consolidating vessels and saving 
fuel. Economically, data for the 2010 fishing season indicate that, 
while gross revenues for groundfish in the fishery were down $1.8 
million compared 2009, total revenues increased $26.6 million.48   
Additionally, while reductions in catch limits certainly are a primary 
factory, sectors appear to be assimilating the conservation goals of the 
program. It is reported that no sector exceeded its quota in the first 
year of the sector program.49 Because sector fish are no longer 
common pool resources, sector members have a conservation 
incentive to, for example, invest in gear that reduces habitat 
destruction and improves sustainability.50 Additionally, where before 
there was a strong history of antagonism between fishing 
communities and scientists, academics, conservationists, and non-
profits, sector members have been incentivized due to severe financial 
constraints to collaborate with these groups to transition 
administrative and operating practices and to monitor compliance and 
stock levels.51 These collaborations have built stronger, more resilient 
trust relationships, and the industry now has a more active role in the 
collection and evaluation of data used for regulatory purposes.  
Yet it appears that NOAA Fisheries may have implemented its 
innovations too late in the Atlantic cod fishery’s decline to make a 
real difference in species recovery. Despite gains in domestic fish 
                                                
43 Fleming et al., supra note 40, at 618. 
44 Jonathan M. Labaree, Sector Management in New England’s Groundfish Fishery: Dramatic 
Change Spurs Innovation, Gulf of Maine Research Institute 2012, 
http://www.gmri.org/sites/default/files/resource/sector_management_in_new_engla
nd.pdf. 
45 Compliance is monitored with reports from seafood dealers, with dockside and at-sea 
monitors, and by fish trades amongst sectors Id. Vessels also are required to maintain an 
operational Vessel Monitoring System. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 648.85(a)(3)(i); § 648.10. 
46 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,114. 
47 Labaree, supra note 44, at 6. 
48 See Shelley, supra note 36, at 57. 
49 Shannon Carroll, Sector Allocation: A Misguided Solution, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 163, 
188 (2011). 
50 Id. at 12. Labaree, supra note 44, at 6. 
51 See, e.g., Rachel Gallant Feeney, Kenneth J. La Valley & Madeleine Hall-Arber, Assessing 
Stakeholder Perspectives on the Impacts of a Decade of Collaborative Fisheries Research in the Gulf of 
Maine and Georges Bank, MARINE & COASTAL FISHERIES: DYNAMICS, MGMT. & 
ECOSYSTEM SCIENCE 2, 205–216 (2010). 
The Role of Law in Reducing Barriers to Citizens Participation in Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management Models – Becky L. Jacobs 
– 88 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
stock sustainability overall, the acting US Secretary of Commerce 
declared a commercial fishery failure for the Northeast 
Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery for the 2013 fishing season, and, 
in that year, cod catch and price decreases contributed to a 66.2% 
decline in revenue.52 In 2014, NOAA Fisheries scientists reported 
that New England cod stock dropped to all-time record low levels, 
with a population at only 3-4% of sustainable yield.53 Overfishing 
is not the only cause of this decline; pollution, construction 
acivities, and the rapid warming of waters of the New England 
coast all have been identified as factors in the collapse.54 Fishery 
stakeholders are confronting monumental challenges, but, from a 
CBNRM programmatic perspective, sector “community user 
groups” in the US Atlantic cod fishery advocating for management 
approaches that continue to weaken or decrease stocks clearly are 
failing to improve resource management outcomes, a primary 
objective of the CBNRM framework. 
§ 3 – BARRIERS TO CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN CBNRM 
AND POSSIBLE LEGAL INTERVENTIONS 
CBNRM has the potential to increase citizen participation in 
environmental and natural resource management, strengthening 
the democratic process. However, as the two examples discussed 
above demonstrate, there are unique challenges to involving 
citizens in programs that govern highly technical, multidimensional 
ecological systems. Further, each CBNRM project confronts a 
distinct set of concerns based upon idiosyncratic historical and 
sociocultural contexts.55 
The contextual distinctions between the Namibian wildlife and the US 
Atlantic cod fishery CBNRM examples are evident. While both 
                                                
52 HAROLD F. UPTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34209, COMMERCIAL FISHERY 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34209.pdf; 2013 
Final Report on the Performance of the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery 
[May 2013 – April 2014] 22 (2nd Ed. Sept. 2015) (2013 Final Report), Northeast Fisheries 
Science Center Reference Document 15-02, 
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1502/crd1502-2nd-edition.pdf. 
53 STATEMENT BY JOHN BULLARD, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, GREATER ATLANTIC 
REGION, ON GULF OF MAINE AND HADDOCK INTERIM AND EMERGENCY ACTIONS, 
NOAA FISHERIES (Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/gloucestertimes.com/content/tncms/a
ssets/v3/editorial/6/ad/6ad9a8ae-691a-11e4-ab67-
6b894b7a21e6/5461249c40e50.pdf.pdf. Despite these dire data, regulators actually 
proposed reducing at-sea monitoring requirements in the Northeast Fisheries Observer 
Program in 2016. See Prop. NOAA Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) FMP 
Framework Adjustment 55, 50 C.F.R. § 648, 81 Fed. Reg. 15003, 15015-19, 15025-26, 
15032-15033 (Mar. 21, 2016),  
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-03-21/pdf/2016-06186.pdf. The proposal 
would drop monitoring levels from 24% of trips to 14% at a time when the cod fishery 
appears to be nearing collapse, ostensibly to relieve the financial burden on groundfish 
fishermen.   
54 See Shelley, supra note 36, at 70-72. See also Andrew J. Pershing, et al., Slow Adaptation in 
the Face of Rapid Warming Leads to Collapse of the Gulf of Maine Cod Fishery, 350 SCIENCE 809 
(2015). 
55 Julia Olson & Patricia Pinto Da Silva, Changing Boundaries and Institutions in Environmental 
Governance: Perspectives on Sector Management of the Northeast U.S. Groundfish Fishery, 13 
MARITIME STUDIES 1, 4 (2014). 
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programs manage “mobile or fugitive resources … [that require] 
coordination across multiple administrative units,”56 the profiles of the 
user communities and their management challenges are vastly different. 
Many Namibian conservancies, for example, encompass one or 
more distinct traditional communities. Traditional authorities in 
these communities still exercise extensive authority, and 
community members adhere to customary roles. Accordingly, 
while data report that women are well represented among 
conservancy staffs, these staff jobs are typically aligned with 
culturally-ascribed gender activities such as cleaning and cooking.57 
CBNRM programs may encourage women and other marginalized 
community members to enroll in conservancies, but, without 
addressing existing power hierarchies, these members are likely to 
feel disempowered.58 More generally, low literacy rates are a 
significant barrier to conservancy participation, either economically 
or managerially.   
This compromises the “defined community of users” design factor that 
appears to be an important feature of successful CBNRM programs, as 
well as several other of those characteristics.  If the Namibian 
government privileges traditional male leaders, women and other 
marginalized individuals may decide that their costs to participate in the 
program are greater than any benefit they may derive and will withdraw 
their support for, or contributions to, the program. 
Law can mandate transparency, accountability, and non-discrimination, 
but it will not immediately reverse historical community socio-cultural 
norms and traditions. Properly designed, however, legal interventions 
may have the power: (1) to authorize or expand access to education and 
skills/technical training; (2) to provide financing for economic and 
social capital development to marginalized conservancy members as a 
path to influence in conservancy management; and (3) to legislate 
minimum committee membership allocations, voting requirements, 
and flexible work scheduling. 
Contrast the Namibian conservancy experiences with that of the 
sectors in the Northeastern US fishery. Sector members primarily 
are literate business owners or employees with verifiable 
experience in the Atlantic cod fishery. Because all members are 
jointly liable for compliance with the sector’s annual catch limit, 
most sectors formed along social or cultural lines and are 
geographically based; sectors may be further identified by gear type 
or by affiliation with an industry group.59 While these citizens have 
operated largely independently in the fishery, and they may have 
found it more difficult to transition to collaborative management,60 
they have strong social networks. Network norms and other 
                                                
56 Elizabeth Burleson & Diana Pei Wu, supra note 7, at 202. 
57 Pempelani Mufune, Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and 
Sustainable Development in Namibia, 3 J. LAND & RURAL STUD. 121, 132 (2015).   
58 Id. at 133. 
59 Labaree, supra note 44. 
60 Laura Taylor Singer, The Development of Catch Shares: Lessons Learned from New England, 
Gulf of Maine Research Institute 2011,  
http://www.gmri.org/sites/default/files/resource/the_development_of_catch_shares.
pdf. 
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elements of social capital likely facilitated their participation in the 
sector program.61   
Yet the cod population is still crashing in the NEFCM region. 
While there are multiple factors affecting cod stocks, many of the 
characteristics present in successful CBNRM programs also appear 
to be lacking in the NEFMC sector program, potentially with 
negative impacts on program outcomes. For example, many 
contend that the defined community in the sector system excludes 
a number of important users, including important recreational 
interests, and that it allocates benefits unevenly.62 Further, the costs 
of participation in the program may be disproportional to the 
benefits for many users. Finally, in this instance, the government 
appears to have all but ceded management control to sector 
interests, potentially sacrificing long-term stock recovery for short-
term economic motivations.  
Even had all of the design features of a successful CBNRM 
program been present, however, a legally enforceable model may, 
regrettably, have been proposed and implemented at a point in the 
US Atlantic fishery when the cod population may be beyond 
recovery.   
CONCLUSION 
The CBNRM model has the potential to increase citizen 
participation in decisions that impact natural systems. Natural 
resource and environmental management choices encompass a 
wide range of considerations, including natural, social, political 
sciences, economics, cultural and other contextual influences, and 
they must be made in the presence of risk and uncertainty. The 
first-hand ecological knowledge of local resource users can be an 
invaluable component of decisions about resource administration, 
and it can illuminate existing scientific data and guide future 
research efforts.63 
However, in order for their participation to be meaningful, 
individuals must have, or must develop, the skills to engage in an 
effective, empowered, and timely way. While not a panacea, law 
can play a critical role in promoting the conditions in which citizens 
can acquire such skills and authority. Further, law can structure and 
adapt public participation to accommodate a CBNRM program’s 
cultural context, political and economic environment, resource 
type, or ecological setting.  
In addition to encouraging citizen participation in environmental 
protection and natural resource decision-making, laws promoting 
CBNRM should also be crafted so as to achieve the framework’s 
other primary objective, to improve resource management 
outcomes. Those who have the authority and capacity to 
                                                
61 James Acheson & Roy Gardner, Fishing Failure and Success in the Gulf of Maine: Lobster and 
Groundfish Management, 13 MARITIME STUDIES 8 (2014). 
62 Emily Yehle, Senators Want Recreational Interests Included in Updated Law, FISHERIES, E&E 
NEWS PM (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060036215. 
63 See generally Feeney et al., supra note 51. 
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participate must be accountable for its exercise; the law must 
improve accountability and transparency, at all levels of 
governance. 
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